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Extensive research has documented the importance of social trust for economic development, yet the
origins of trust remain largely unexplored. This paper examines the historical relationship between
risk, cooperation and the emergence of social trust. I hypothesize that norms of trust developed in pre-
industrial times as a result of experiences of collective action and mutual insurance triggered by the
need for subsistence farmers to cope with climatic risk. These norms persisted over time, even after
climate had become largely unimportant for economic activity. I test this hypothesis in the context of
Europe combining high-resolution climate data for the period 1500-2000 with contemporary survey
data at the sub-national level. I find that regions characterized by higher year-to-year variability in
precipitation and temperature display higher levels of trust. Consistent with a theory of insurance
through geographic differentiation, I also find that trust is higher in regions with more spatially het-
erogeneous precipitation. Furthermore, variation in social trust is driven by weather patterns during
the growing season and by historical rather than recent variability. These results are robust to the
inclusion of country fixed-effects, a variety of geographical controls, and regional measures of early
political and economic development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a widespread consensus among social scientists that social trust is important for economic
and institutional development because it facilitates cooperation and collective action among the mem-
bers of a community.1 Despite the multitude of intriguing results on the role of trust, only recently
economists have begun to investigate the historical origins of trust and to explain the large differences
in trust across and within countries (Tabellini, 2005; Guiso et al., 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2009).
These studies have documented how historical circumstances, particuarly experiences of cooperation
or conflict like the free-city state experience in medieval Italy and the slave trade in Africa, can have
long lasting effects on the level of trust of a community.
This paper investigates whether other more primitive and universal factors may explain differ-
ential historical patterns in the emergence of cooperative behavior and differences in current levels
of trust. In particular I examine the historical relationship between environmental risk - captured by
variability in climatic conditions - and the evolution of cooperation and trust.
I propose a simple explanation of the emergence of trust based on the need of subsistence
farmers to cope with weather fluctuations which, in the context of a pre-industrial rural economy,
represented one of the main sources of risk. In the absence of well-functioning credit and insurance
markets, farmers had to rely on a variety of strategies to shield consumption from weather-related
shocks. While some of these strategies could be efficiently implemented by a single household, oth-
ers involved some degree of interaction with members of the broader community. On the one hand,
collective action among members of the local community was needed for large-scale investments such
as the construction of collective storage and irrigation facilities. On the other hand, insurance capacity
against climate-related risk could be improved by expanding economic relations to individuals living
in neighboring areas, who were likely to be affected by weather fluctuations in less correlated ways.
For example, cases of inter-community exchange, and geographically diversified mutual insurance ar-
rangements are well-documented in the historical, anthropological and economic literature (Kirkby,
1974; Dean et al., 1985; Halstead and O’Shea, 1989; Platteau, 2000). However, the creation and
maintenance of socio-economic connections over larger areas would have entailed higher costs since
incentive and information problems would be more severe among geographically distant individuals.
The degree of intra- and inter-community cooperation would depend on: a) the relative magnitude
of the weather-related risk (measured by the variability of weather over time at a given location); b)
the potential insurance benefit from risk-pooling (measured by the variability of weather fluctuations
across neighboring locations). To the extent to which experiences of cooperation favored the emer-
gence of a culture of trust that continues to persist today, one would expect differences in historical
1 This argument was put forth long ago by Kenneth Arrow (1972) who argued that “virtually every commercial transaction
has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”
Other influential contributions on the role of social capital and social trust are Coleman (1988), Putnam et al. (1993)
and Fukuyama (1996). Social capital and trust have been associated with well-functioning institutions (Knack, 2002),
economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001), low corruption and
crime (Uslaner, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2009), financial development (Guiso et al., 2004a) and trade (Guiso et al.,
2004b).
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climate variability to explain in part differences in current levels of trust.
I test this prediction in the context of Europe, combining high-resolution climate data for the
period 1500-2000 with contemporary survey data on self-reported level of trust available from the
European Social Survey for a sample of 251 regions in 24 countries. I first investigate the relation-
ship between current trust and variability using climate data for the last century, because the finer
resolution of this data allow the study of both the temporal and spatial dimensions of variability. The
analysis confirms that regions with greater inter-annual fluctuations in temperature and precipitation
have higher levels of interpersonal trust. This result is primarily driven by weather variability in
the growing-season months, consistent with the effect of climatic risk operating primarily through
agriculture. Furthermore, for a given level of temporal variability, regions with a higher degree of
within-region spatial correlation in precipitation fluctuations display lower trust, a result consistent
with an explanation involving insurance through geographic differentiation. These findings are ro-
bust to the inclusion of a variety of geographic controls and of country-fixed effects which capture
the political and historical background common to regions of the same country.
I then replicate the analysis using climate data for the period 1500-1750. The relationship
between historical climatic variability and trust is positive and significant, even after controlling for
climate variability between 1900-2000, which does not appear to have an independent effect on trust.
These findings support an explanation based on the historical formation and long-term persistence
of trust attitudes over possible alternative arguments stressing the effect of contemporary climate
variability on trust.
To further test the long-term effect of climatic risk on the emergence of cultural norms, I also
look at the relationship between climate variability and the role of the family. Previous research has
documented the existence of a negative relationship between social trust and the strength of family
ties: the greater the importance of the family to the individual, the less their sense of community
and civic engagement (Banfield, 1958; Ermisch and Gambetta, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009).
According to the argument sketched above, a more variable environment should increase an individ-
ual’s propensity to interact with non-family members and reduce her dependency on the family for
insurance purposes. If trust outside and within the family are substitutes, then higher climate vari-
ability should be associated with weaker family ties. I test this hypothesis using individual data on
the importance of the family available from the European Value Survey. The results are the mirror
image of those found for trust: a) weaker family ties in regions with more temporal variability in
precipitation and temperature (particularly in the growing season), b) weaker family ties in regions in
which precipitation fluctuations are less spatially correlated, and c) a negative relationship between
historical climate variability and the strength of family ties even after controlling for contemporary
variability.
After establishing the relationship between hisorical climate variability and social trust, I ex-
plore the robustness of this result by controlling for regional measures of early political and econonomic
development such as urbanization, political institutions and literacy. My results confirm the impor-
tance of early political institutions and literacy for the emergence of social trust as previously doc-
umented by Tabellini (2005). At the same time I find that historical climate variability continues to
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have a positive and sizeable effect on current trust. One interpretation of this result is that the de-
mand for insurance against climatic risk may have also fostered the emergence of trust by favoring
the adoption of informal collective arrangements whose long-lasting effect on trust is not captured by
historical differences in formal political institutions.
The results of this research complement the literature on the long-term persistence of cultural
norms (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Guiso et al., 2007; Tabellini, 2008) by documenting that historical
patterns of cooperation in response to risk continue to influence how individuals relate to each other
today, both within and outside the family. The evidence presented here also dovetails nicely with the
few existing studies on the historical determinants of differences in social capital and trust (Tabellini,
2005; Guiso et al., 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2009), and with previous research on the relationship
between trust and the importance of the family (Banfield, 1958; Ermisch and Gambetta, 2008; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2009).
My findings can also be interpreted in the context of the debate on the effects of geography
on economic development. Previous research has documented that the environment can influence
economic performance directly, through its effect on health and agricultural productivity (Landes,
1998; Sachs and Malaney, 2002), and indirectly, by setting the conditions in which sociopolitical
institutions have formed (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine,
2003) or by defining environmental constraints to population growth (Galor and Weil, 2000).2 The
evidence presented here suggests that geography may also have influenced the emergence of particular
cultural traits which, in turn, continue to have an effect on economic outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses evidence on the relationship
between climatic risk and cooperation, describes the conceptual framework and illustrates its predic-
tions. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 illustrates the empirical strategy and presents the results
obtained using both contemporary and historical climate data. Finally, section 5 summarizes the key
findings and concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
I. ON CLIMATE, RISK AND COOPERATION
An extensive literature has investigated the impact of climate on various aspects of human activity
including agricultural productivity (Adams et al., 1990; Mendelsohn et al., 1994; Schlenker et al.,
2005), health (Curriero et al., 2002; Deschenes and Moretti, 2007; Gallup and Sachs, 2001) and con-
flict (Miguel et al., 2004).3 Most contributions have looked at the effect of mean climatic conditions,
seasonality, or extreme events. However, other dimensions of climate are also relevant. In particu-
lar, year-to-year variability in climatic conditions has traditionally represented an important source of
2 Other examples of how biogeographical factors can have long-lasting effects on different aspects of human development
are discussed in Diamond (1997); Michalopoulos (2008); Nunn et al. (2009); Ashraf et al. (2009)
3 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the effect of climate on human activity see the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change 4th Assessment Report (IPCC 2007)
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risk for agriculture and other natural resource-dependent activities.4 Even today, interannual fluctua-
tions in precipitation and temperature account for a large fraction of the year-to-year variations in crop
yields (Lobell and Field, 2007) and crop failure rates (Mendelsohn, 2007); this despite the widespread
availability of irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and new crop varieties which reduce yield sensitivity to
weather conditions. Rural populations were even more vulnerable to erratic weather in past centuries
when the availability of these instruments was limited, and there was a greater dependence on natural
resources for survival (Solomou and Wu, 1999; Le Roy Ladurie, 2004; Brunt, 2004).
In the absence of well-functioning credit and insurance markets, subsistence farmers in pre-
industrial societies adopted a variety of strategies to cope with climate-related risk, as documented by
historical evidence and corroborated by findings from today’s developing countries.5 Some of these
strategies could be efficiently implemented at the household level. For example, farmers could have
mitigated the economic impact of climate fluctuations by extending the set of livelihood activities to
include foraging and fishing (Kates et al., 1985), by diversifying crops (Halstead and O’Shea, 1989),
by selecting crops varieties that were less sensitive to weather realizations (Morduch, 1995), or by
scattering their plots over larger and varied areas in order to reduce the risk of crop failure due to
highly localized weather events (McCloskey, 1976).
Another range of risk-coping strategies involved interaction and collective action with mem-
bers of the broader rural community. Farmers could self-insure against adverse climatic events by
storing grains or other assets in good years for bad years. Although storage could be carried out by
single households in isolation, since storage technologies are characterized by significant economies
of scale, collective action among members of the local community to build communal storage facil-
ities entailed large efficiency gains and was often practiced.(Stead, 2004) An example of the role of
collective storage facilities in coping with weather and price volatility is analyzed by Berg (2007)
in his recent work on the grain banks (magasins) in 18th and 19th century Swedish parishes. Intra-
community collective action was crucial for the realization of other large-scale investments aimed at
reducing vulnerability to weather shocks. For example, village-level irrigation and water manage-
ment systems (e.g. wells, tanks, dikes) could increase the stability of the farming system in the face
of erratic rainfall, particularly in drought-prone zones. Examples of farmer-managed irrigation sys-
tems are discussed by Bardhan (2000) and Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) for contemporary India, and
by Lam (1998) and Ostrom (2000) for Nepal. Finally, in his work on adaptation to environmental
risks in Vietnam, Adger (2000) emphasizes the importance of collective action for the management
4 Variability is the product of both low and high-frequency climatic processes. While low-frequency processes have long
cycles (longer than a human generation) and are responsible for major phenomena such as fluctuations in groundwater
levels, erosion, etc., high frequency processes exhibit shorter cycles and are responsible for seasonal and year-to-year
fluctuations. While low-frequency variability is usually not apparent to humans, high-frequency and particularly year-
to-year variability represents a major determinant of fluctuations in natural resource productivity and an important
source of risk for economic activity.
5 The issue of adaptation to climate variability has attracted the interest of different disciplines, particularly in the con-
text of the effect of anthropogenic climate change on socio-economic development. Many definitions of adaptation
and different categorization of adaptive strategies have been proposed in the literature (see among others Smithers and
Smit (1997)). Rennie and Singh (1996) for example, define adaptive strategies as “those ways in which local individ-
uals, households and communities change their mix of productive activities, and modified their community rules and
institutions in response to vulnerabilities, in order to meet their livelihood needs”.
5
of local-level coastal defense against hazards associated with flooding and typhoons.
Other risk-coping strategies were based on the possibility of pooling risk with other individu-
als, through exchange or mutual insurance relations. A rich literature in economics, anthropology and
history has documented the importance of risk-sharing mechanisms to cope with idiosyncratic agri-
cultural risks (see among others Townsend, 1994).6 Research on the use of these mechanism to buffer
covariant (weather-related) risk is more sparse (Scott, 1976; Kimball, 1988; Platteau, 1991). Family-
and kin-related connections are generally particularly effective in providing partial insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks due to the lower cost of enforcing promises and monitoring deviance among fam-
ily members. However, these networks are generally too small and spatially concentrated to provide
insurance against weather-related risks. Insurance capacity against weather shocks can be improved
by expanding the radius of socio-economic relations to individuals living in distinct locations who
are likely to be affected by shocks in less correlated ways. However, the creation and maintenance
of geographically dispersed socio-economic connections would have entailed higher communication
and monitoring costs. Platteau (1991) describes this “insurance dilemma” in the following terms:
“the larger and geographically less concentrated the social group concerned in the insurance scheme,
the lower the covariance of their income and contingencies is likely to be, but the more serious the
moral hazard problem”.
Examples of spatially diversified risk-pooling arrangements and of their usefulness in mitigat-
ing the effects of covariant shocks have been discussed by scholars from various disciplines working
on very different geographical and historical contexts. Some of these arrangements involved ex-
change and trade relations. For example, in their study on the behavioral and cultural responses to
environmental variability of the Anasazi civilization in the American Southwest, Dean et al. (1985)
emphasize the importance of trade alliances among communities located in environmentally hetero-
geneous zones to cope with the frequent local subsistence shocks. Similarly, King (1976) emphasizes
the importance of the elaborate inter-village exchange system used by the native population of the
Chumash in coping with the considerable temporal and spatial variability of the Southern Califor-
nian environment. Other accounts refer to informal mutual assistance arrangements. In his study of
the Kwakiutl native population of the Northwestern coast of America, Piddocke (1965) analyzes the
pot-latch, a system based on delayed gift exchange among different groups (numaym) and used to
“counter the effect of varying resources productivity by promoting exchanges of food from groups
enjoying a temporary surplus to groups suffering a temporary deficit”. Another example is the hxaro
system used by the Kung San hunter-gatherers in contemporary Botswana and described by Cash-
dan (1985) as a system of mutual reciprocity based on delayed gift exchange connecting members
of different bands living in distinct locations over distances of up to 400 km. Analogous evidence is
available for subsistence farmers in contemporary developing countries. In his investigation on the
Ivory Coast, Grimard (1997) finds evidence of partial insurance against locally covariant risk taking
place within spatially differentiated networks formed around ethnic bonds. Similarly, in his study
6 Solidarity mechanisms are generally organized around delayed reciprocity contingent upon need and affordability, with
contingent transfers taking the form of gifts, food, labor assistance, or loans. For a comprehensive discussion of the role
and functioning of solidarity networks in pre-industrial societies see Fafchamps (1992).
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on the effect of risk and social connections on livestock asset dynamic in northern Ethiopia, Mogues
(2006) finds that being part of a geographically dispersed network reduces the degree to which an
household’s livestock wealth is eroded following an adverse climatic shocks. Finally, in the context
of pre-industrial Europe, Richardson (2005) emphasizes the role of rural fraternities as risk pooling
institutions and their importance in coping with both weather- and non-weather related agricultural
risk in medieval England. Similar evidence is available from Baker (1999) who investigates the role of
regional voluntary associations as collective means used by XVIII century french peasants to defend
themselves against climatic shocks.
These examples illustrate the extent to which the ability of a society to adapt to climate vari-
ability depends on the capacity of its members to act collectively. Furthermore, the above discussion
suggests the importance of both the temporal and spatial dimension of climate variability for the
emergence of intra- and inter-community cooperation. On the one hand, cooperation would be more
valuable in areas characterized by more erratic weather (higher temporal variability), since exposure
to greater climatic risk would result in greater demand for insurance and would increase the incentive
to forge social connections within both the local and neighboring communities. On the other hand,
cooperation would be more beneficial in areas in which weather fluctuations are more unsynchronized
across neighbors (higher spatial variability) since this would increase the potential insurance benefit
from pooling risk with neighbors.7
II. EMERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE OF TRUST
Previous research in evolutionary anthropology on social learning (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1995)
provides a good theoretical framework to study the emergence of mutual trust. In this literature,
cultural norms are modeled as behavioral heuristics that simplify decision-making. In a context in
which acquiring and processing information necessary to behaving optimally is costly, using general
“rules-of-thumb” about the right thing to do can be optimal. Since different behavioral norms are
available a priori, which norms are adopted is determined through an evolutionary process based
on which ones yield the highest payoff in terms of survival probabilities. This, in turn depends
on the external constraints faced by each society. Over time, through a process of social learning,
rules-of-thumb that favor adaptability to the external environment will become more prevalent in the
population. For example, in situations in which large-scale cooperation increase fitness, norms that
facilitate fruitful interaction (such as norms of mutual trust) will be particularly valuable and will
7 An illuminating discussion of this aspect is offered by Dean et al. (1985) who argument that “spatial variability in
climate facilitates or inhibits certain responses to local subsistence stresses. During periods of high spatial variability,
interaction and exchange with other populations are viable means of offsetting local production inadequacies because
different groups are likely to be experiencing different degrees and kinds of subsistence stress. Conversely, when similar
conditions prevail across the region, all areas are affected uniformly, and interaction and exchange become far less useful
ways of alleviating local population-resource imbalances.”
7
become prevalent.8
Based on this conceptual framework, the hypothesis advanced in this paper is that norms of
trust developed because they facilitated collective action and risk-sharing among subsistence farmers
exposed to weather-related risk in pre-industrial times. In particular, a culture of greater trust should
have emerged in areas characterized by more variable and spatially heterogeneous weather patterns,
in which extra-familial cooperation would have been particularly beneficial to coping with risk. This
paper investigates the empirical validity of this argument by testing whether higher trust is observed
today in regions historically characterized by: i) higher inter annual weather variability, and ii) lower
spatial correlation in weather fluctuations.
These predictions are based on the assumption that differences in trust have persisted over
time, even after weather patterns became less important for economic activity. Growing evidence
suggest that in fact trust attitudes, like other cultural traits, can persist for surprisingly long periods
of time. At the national and sub-national levels, for example, trust scores are remarkably stable over
several decades (Bjørnskov, 2007). At the individual level, this persistence is generally attributed
to intergenerational transmission operating through genetics, imitation, or deliberate inculcation by
parents. This view is consistent with recent empirical findings documenting the existence of a strong
correlation in the propensity to trust between parents and children (Katz and Rotter, 1969; Dohmen et
al., 2008) and between second-generation immigrants and current inhabitants of the country of origin
(Uslaner, 2002; Guiso et al., 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2007).
Additional insights into the persistence of cultural norms are offered by recent empirical con-
tributions on the historical determinants of trust. In a recent study on the effect of culture on economic
development across European regions Tabellini (2005) finds that early political institutions have a sig-
nificant impact on current trust attitudes: regions that centuries ago had more checks and balances on
the executive are characterized by higher levels of trust. Guiso et al. (2008) trace current differences
in social capital between the North and South of Italy to the culture of independence fostered by the
experience of the free city-states in the Middle Ages, and conclude that “at least 50% of the North-
South gap in social capital is due to the lack of a free city state experience in the South”9. Finally,
Nunn and Wantchekon (2009) investigate the impact of the transatlantic slave trade on mistrust in
contemporary Africa, finding robust evidence that “individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided
during the slave trade today exhibit less trust in neighbors, relatives, and their local government”.
Another stream of literature relevant to this research concerns the relationship between social
trust and family values. The trust literature typically distinguishes between “generalized” trust and
“particularized” trust. Particularized trust refers to those cases in which individuals trust members of
a narrow circle of family members or close friends, but do not trust (and do not expect to be trusted
8 In the context of a large cross-cultural study, Henrich et al. (2001) conducted ultimatum, public good, and dictator game
experiments with subjects from fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural condi-
tions. They find that, in societies where payoff from extra-familial cooperation in economic activity is higher, subjects
display significantly higher levels of cooperation in the experimental games. The authors argue that one interpretation
of this result is that subjects’ behavior in the experiments reflect different norms of conduct with regard to sharing and
cooperation, which, in turn, are shaped by the structures of social interaction and modes of livelihood of the community
daily life.
9 This findings support the conjecture originally formulated by Putnam et al. (1993)
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by) people outside of it. Generalized trust applies instead to everyone, including agents for whom the
agent has no direct information10. Empirical evidence suggest that these two objects are negatively
correlated. Using survey data from multiple sources Alesina and Giuliano (2009) find that individuals
with strong family ties display lower levels of generalized trust, civic engagement and political par-
ticipation. According to their argument, “the more people rely on the family as a provider of services,
insurance, transfer of resources, the lower is civic engagement and political participation. The more
the family is all that matters for an individual the less she will care about the rest of society” (p.3).
Similar results are found by Ermisch and Gambetta (2008) who combine experimental and survey
data drawn from Great Britain. At the heart of their analysis lies the concept of “outward exposure”
and the idea that trust attitudes are affected by “any factor which either constrains people within the
family circle or that gives them an opportunity and a motive to interact with others, whether neighbors
or strangers”. If, as these findings suggest, trust and family values operate as cultural substitutes, then
climate variability - by increasing the payoff to extra-familial cooperation and decreasing the depen-
dency on the family for insurance purposes - would have favored the development of norms consistent
with higher trust and weaker family values. As a way of further testing my theoretical argument in
what follows I also explore the empirical relationship between climate variability and family ties.
III. DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
To test the main predictions of my theoretical argument, I look at differences across and within Eu-
ropean countries.11 I employ several types of data in different parts of the empirical analysis: survey
data on social trust and strength of family ties; contemporary and historical climatic data on precipi-
tation and temperature; data on a variety of regional geographical controls; historical data on political
institutions, education and urbanization. In what follows I first describe the data sources and then
discuss how the variables used in the empirical analysis are constructed.
I. DATA
I.1. SOCIAL TRUST
Measuring interpersonal trust is a problematic task. Several variables have been proposed in the
literature as proxies for social trust. Some have used aggregate indicators such as the number of
10 This distinction reflects the distinction between “generalized” and “limited” morality stressed by (Platteau, 2000)
11 There are a number of reasons why Europe can be considered a good context to test the validity of my hypothesis.
First, up until the onset of the industrial revolution, the vast majority of the European continent was rural, most of the
population depended predominantly on agriculture for subsistence, and the economy was characterized by relatively
low spatial mobility and considerable intergenerational persistence in occupation.Le Roy Ladurie (2004) Second, an
advantage of working with European data, particularly at the sub-national level, is given by the relatively small size
of European regions. Since the proposed relationship between climatic volatility and emergence of trust operates at a
relatively local scale, the availability of trust data for fairly small administrative divisions is particularly valuable.
My theoretical argument is based on the hypothesis that cultural norms developed at a given location are passed on to
subsequent generations, which, to a large extent, continue to live in the same area. To this regard Europe represents
an appropriate context because - despite significant cross- and within-country migration - it has not experienced the
massive migration movements that took place for example in North and South America over the last five centuries, and,
in general, a substantial portion of individuals living in a given region had ancestors that lived in the same region. Last
but not least, Europe is also the continent for which better historical climate data are readily available.
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civic and non-profit organizations/associations, turnout in elections or referenda, and blood and organ
donations(Guiso et al., 2004a, 2008; Buonanno et al., 2009; Putnam et al., 1993). Most contributions,
however, employ measures of self-reported trust based on individual responses to survey questions
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Tabellini, 2005). I follow the latter approach, using data on self-
reported trust in others from the three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), a biennial cross-
sectional survey designed to monitor attitudes and behaviors across (mostly) European countries12,
similar in many aspects to the American General Social Survey (GSS). The three rounds of the survey
were conducted in 2002-03, 2004-05, and 2006-07. Overall, the ESS data cover 31 countries: the
large majority of the European Union members plus Iceland, Israel, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Most countries were surveyed in all three ESS rounds, some, instead, only in one or two of the rounds.
In addition to providing information on the respondent’s country, the ESS surveys report the
region in which the interviewee resides. This feature makes it possible to study differences in trust
attitudes at the sub-national level, an approach that is consistent with my theoretical argument which
links the evolution of trust to social responses to climate variability on a local scale. The ESS regions
are generally defined in accordance with the administrative divisions used in each country. These, in
turn, often coincide with one of the three levels of the European NUTS classification13. The number
and size of the ESS regions vary considerably from country to country. For example, France is divided
into nine large regions roughly corresponding to NUTS level 1, Italy into 20 regions corresponding
to NUTS level 2, and Bulgaria into 28 regions corresponding to NUTS level 3.
Seven of the thirty-one original ESS countries were excluded from the analysis because they
lie partially or totally outside the area covered by the climate data used. Overall my sample includes
251 regions in 24 countries, comprising approximately 107,000 individuals14. On average, 427 indi-
viduals were interviewed in each region, the median number of respondents being about 306. Table 1
reports the number of respondents in each round for the countries in the sample.
The ESS questionnaire includes a version of the standard trust question used in most surveys,
commonly known as Rosenberg’s question. The exact wording of the question is as follows: “Gen-
erally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and
12 The core module of the ESS questionnaire questions aimed to monitor change and continuity in a wide range of social
variables, including media use, social and public trust, political interest and participation; socio-political orientations,
governance and efficacy; moral, political and social values; social exclusion, national, ethnic and religious allegiances;
well-being, health and security; demographics and socio-economics. The ESS data have been extensively used in
previous studies on culture and social capital, by Luttmer and Singhal (2008); Alesina and Giuliano (2009); Butler et
al. (2009) among others.
13 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a three-level hierarchical classification established by
EUROSTAT in order to provide a single uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production of regional statistics
for the European Union. Depending on their size countries can have only one or two levels of divisions. In the case of
Luxembourg, for example, each of the three NUTS level corresponds to the entire country.
14 The decision of pooling together responses from the three rounds of the ESS is aimed at maximizing the number of
available observations, and is justified by the great stability of both national and regional trust scores over the relative
short length of time between different rounds (2 years).
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10 means that most people can be trusted”15. Doubts have been raised about the ability of this kind
of question to capture individual trust attitudes. For example, some have argued that this question is
a relatively ambiguous in that it does not explicitly specify the object of the respondent’s trust. How-
ever, the impersonal framing of the question (“people”) may be valuable in encouraging respondents
to think about the general context in which they live rather than specific groups such as friends or
relatives. Trust surveys do not display the large and random fluctuations in responses that one would
expect of question of dubious reliability and meaning. On the contrary, average trust scores - both
at the national and sub-national level - show a surprising deal of stability over time Uslaner (2002);
Delhey and Newton (2005). Another element of reassurance is given by the fact that survey-based
measures tend to be correlated with behavioral indicators of trust. For example, Knack (2000) reports
the results of an experiment in which a certain number of wallets containing $50 worth of cash and
the addresses and phone numbers of their putative owners were "accidentally" dropped in each of 20
cities in 14 different western European countries and 12 U.S. cities. He finds that the number of wal-
lets returned with their contents intact - both at the national and regional level - is highly correlated
with the average score in the standard trust question from the World Value Survey. Similarly, at the
individual level, responses to survey-based trust questions have been shown to be good predictors of
actual behavior in trust experiment (Glaeser et al., 2000; Fehr et al., 2003; Sapienza et al., 2007).16
I.2. FAMILY TIES
Measuring cultural differences on the relative importance of the family and the strength of family
ties is often problematic, especially since many surveys do not include questions designed to capture
these aspects. This is the unfortunately the case for the European Social Survey data used to derive
my trust measure. Some relevant questions are however available from another similar survey, the
European Value Study (EVS). In particular, I use data from three waves of the EVS carried out
respectively in the years 1989-1993, 1994-1999, and 1999-2004. Overall, the three waves of the EVS
cover 39 European countries. However, for consistency with the analysis of the trust data, and due
to limitations in the climate data, I restrict my attention to the same 24 countries for which data on
both trust and climate are available. As with the ESS, the EVS data generally include information
on the respondent’s region of residence, allowing for the study of differences at the sub-national
level. Overall the EVS sample for the 24 countries of interest includes almost 82,000 individuals.
15 Unlike other similar surveys (like the World Value Survey) the ESS trust question does not offer a 0-1 choice, but rather
allows respondents to choose a value on a 1-10 scale, thus allowing for a more precise assessment of the the intensity
of trust.
16 These contributions, however, have provided contrasting evidence with regard to whether responses to the trust question
reflect an individual’s own trustworthiness rather than his tendency to trust others. In an attempt to reconcile these
apparently contrasting results, Sapienza et al. (2007) argue that the different findings might be due to differences in the
composition and homogeneity of the two populations showing that an individual’s trust attitude is heavily influenced by
his own trustworthiness in the context of a homogeneous population (such as the Harvard undergraduates participating in
Glaeser’s experiment), but not in a more heterogeneous population, (such as the cross-section of the German population
in Fehr’s sample). Since the ESS surveys a random sample of the adult population of each country, the sample is
extremely heterogeneous with respect to different individual characteristics. In light of the debate discussed above, it
seems plausible that responses to the ESS trust question reflect respondents’ trust attitude towards others rather than
their own trustworthiness.
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For some countries in certain years, however, no information on the respondent’s region is available
(see 2). Excluding these observations, the usable sample includes over 69,000 individuals in over 220
regions. 17
Following Alesina and Giuliano (2007; 2009), I employ three of the EVS questions covering
different aspects of the centrality of family relationships in a person’s life, as well as individual
beliefs about the role and obligations of parents and children. The first question (labeled as Family
important) asks the respondent how important is family in his/her life, the possible answers ranging
from “not very important” (score of 1), to very important (4). The second question (Respect parents)
assesses the respondent’s opinion on whether “children have to respect and love parents only when
these have earned it by their behavior and attitudes” (1), or whether they always have this duty,
regardless of parents’ qualities and faults (2). Finally, the third question (Parents responsibilities)
aims at evaluating respondents’ view about parents’ responsibilities to their children, particularly on
whether “parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well being for
the sake of their children” (1), or whether “it’s parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at
the expense of their own well-being” (2).
I.3. CLIMATE
With regard to climatic variables, I restrict my attention to temperature and precipitation. These two
variables have a considerable impact on agriculture and other natural resource-dependent activities,
are highly correlated with other important factors such as relative humidity, cloud cover, and solar
radiation. I employ two kinds of climatic data covering different time periods. In the first part of
my analysis I use gridded data derived from actual weather station records covering the period 1900-
2000. These are high-quality data, both in terms of temporal frequency and spatial resolution, but
since they only cover the last century they can only be used as a proxy for historical climate. I then
extend the analysis to look directly at historical climate variability using reconstructed paleoclimatic
data for the period 1500-1900. The obvious benefit of these data is that they cover a much longer
period, however, their temporal and spatial resolution is much more coarse. On the one hand, the
high resolution of the 20th century data allows us to analyze both temporal and spatial dimensions of
climate variability. On the other, the use of the historical data in combination with the 20th century
data further allows us to confirm that historical variability, rather than current variability, is correlated
with trust.
1900-2000 Climate data for the last century come from the TS 1.2 data set constructed by the
Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia (Mitchell and Jones, 2005). The
CRU TS 1.2 data are in grid format and cover most of the European surface at a 10-minute spatial
resolution Mitchell and Jones (2005). The grid includes 258 columns and 228 rows. Only data for
land grid cells (overall 31,143) are available. For each cell the data set provides monthly observations
17 The difference between the number of regions in the ESS sample (251) and the number of regions in the EVS sample is
due to the fact that, in some cases, especially for the early waves, the EVS regions coincide with larger administrative
divisions than those used for the ESS.
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on air temperature and precipitation for the period 1901-2000 (1200 data points per cell). The data
are constructed from actual climatic records collected at a number of weather stations throughout
Europe, and generalized at the grid cell level using a particular interpolation technique 18. The cells
in the CRU grid have width of 10 minutes, approximately 10 miles. Each region in my sample
comprises a number of grid cells, which varies considerably depending on the region’s size. To give
a sense of the size of the cells, Figure a1 shows the example of Sicily, a mid-size region in southern
Italy, the surface of which is divided into 85 cells.
1500-1900 Climatic data for past centuries are available from paleoclimatic studies. These kind
of data are not based on actual weather station records, but are rather derived, through a sophisti-
cated process of “reconstruction”, from a multiplicity of indirect proxies such as tree rings, ice cores,
corals, ocean and lake sediments, and documental evidence 19. One of the most recent and advanced
reconstructions of European climate over the last 500 years is the European Seasonal Temperature
and Precipitation Reconstruction (ESTPR henceforth), a product of the work of a group of paleocli-
matologists at the University of Berne, Switzerland (Luterbacher et al., 2004; Pauling et al., 2006)
20.
The ESTPR data are in grid format and cover roughly the same area as the CRU data described
above, although at a much lower spatial resolution. The cells in the ESTPR grid have width of
0.5º, approximately 35 miles. Using the example of Sicily, Figure 2 provides a visual sense of the
difference in cell size between the CRU and the ESTPR. Overall, the ESTPR grid for the precipitation
data includes 72 rows and 132 columns for a total of 5117 land cells. The temperature data set covers
a slightly smaller area including 70 rows and 130 columns, for a total of 4961 land cells. For each
cell the data include seasonal observations for the period 1500-2000 (2000 data points per cell)21.
Measurement error is likely to be more severe in the case of the ESTPR data than for the CRU data
for two orders of reasons: 1) climatic records are derived not from observed data but from proxy
variables through an indirect process of reconstruction; 2) they are interpolated over larger areas.
Despite these limitations, these data, which have not been previously used by social scientists, are
among the best data available on European climate for past centuries.
I.4. REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
Other bio-geographic conditions may have influenced the evolution of cooperation and the emergence
of trust over the course of history. At the same time, some of these factors may be correlated with
climate variability. To test whether climate variability has an independent effect on trust and is not
18 Further information on the characteristics of the CRU data sets is available at http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timm/grid/
CRU_TS_1_2.html. For a detailed description of the primary data sources and of the methods employed in the con-
struction of the TS 1.2 data set see www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/wp55.pdf.
19 For more info...
20 Extensive information on these data, as well as on other climate reconstructions data sets, is available on the website of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Climatic Data Center at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/
paleo/recons.html.
21 While the data for the period 1500-1900 are reconstructed, those for the years 1900-2000 are derived from the CRU
data set described above.
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merely proxying for other geographical characteristics, in addition to the region’s area, I control for
a range of variables that the literature has traditionally identified as important determinants of socio-
economic development.
Average climatic conditions are likely to have had considerable impact on livelihood strategies
and patterns of cooperative behavior. To account for the effect of average climate in estimating my
regressions I control for the average level of temperature and precipitation at the regional level. These
measures are constructed from the same data described above (CRU data for the period 1900-2000,
and ESTPR data for the period 1500-2000), taking the average over the entire period of interest.
Both average land quality in a region and differences in land quality within a region can have
important implications for productivity, mobility, and exchange at the local level.22 To account for
this aspect, measures of both average land quality and variability in land quality at the regional level
are included in all the regressions. High-resolution data on soil suitability are available from the
Food and Agriculture Organization Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (FAO-GAEZ).23,24 The
FAO-GAEZ data are constructed to measure soil suitability for rain-fed crops assuming the absence
of irrigation. This feature make these sort of data particularly suited for the historical analysis of
pre-industrial societies. The FAO-GAEZ database include a variety of measures of soil suitability.
Since I separately control for mean climatic conditions in the regressions, I employ a measure that
captures all those soil characteristics that affect land suitability for rain-fed crops, abstracting from
average local climate.25 The data are in grid format, have very high resolution (1’), and assign to each
grid cell a score from 0 (totally unsuitable), to 7 (very suitable). As regional measures of average
land quality and variability in land quality I use the mean and the standard deviation of the suitability
index over all cells in a region.
Terrain ruggedness can have both direct and indirect effects on patterns of human interaction
and on economic outcomes (Nunn et al., 2009). To some extent, ruggedness and elevation can also
be expected to be correlated with climate variability, especially with regard to its spatial dimension.
The presence of a mountain can cause very different microecosystems to manifest over relatively
small distances; as a consequence, climatic realization on the one side of the mountain can be very
different from those of the other side. To control for the relationship between climate variability and
topography, I include a regional measure of terrain ruggedness in my regressions constructed from
the Global Land One-km Base Elevation Project (GLOBE), a global gridded digital elevation data set
22 In his recent study on the environmental origins of ethnolinguistic diversity, Michalopoulos (2008) argues that, by
favoring the accumulation of region-specific human capital, differences in land endowments limited population mobility
and lead to the formation of localized ethnolinguistic groups.
23 More information on the FAO-GAEZ project can be found at http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/agll/gaez/index.htm
24 Data from FAO-GAEZ were used by Michalopoulos (2008), and by Nunn and Qian (2008) who investigate the effect
of the introduction of potato on modern European economic and demographic growth.
25 The FAO-GAEZ measure of combined soil constraints considers the following factors: slope constraints, terrain fertil-
ity constraints, drainage constraints, texture constraints, and chemical constraints. A more detail and comprehensive
description of the criteria is available at: http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/agll/gaez/index.htm
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covering the Earth’s surface at a 10-minute spatial resolution (approximately 1km).26,27
Access to waterways may potentially be correlated with both climate variability and the his-
torical emergence of interpersonal trust. On the one hand, in coastal areas, climate fluctuations can
be less extreme than in interior areas, due to the mitigating influence of the sea. On the other hand,
one could expect individuals living in regions with no access to the sea to have been historically less
exposed to other populations, and as a consequence, to be less inclined to relate to, interact with,
and trust strangers. A similar argument can be made for access to rivers which have historically rep-
resented important ways of communication particularly in areas with limited access to the sea. To
control for proximity to the sea in my cross-regional regressions I include two variables: a dummy
for the region being landlocked, and the distance of the region’s centroid from the coast line. To
account for access to rivers I control for the number of large rivers - longer than 200 km - passing
through each region. Data on the geographic distribution of major European rivers are available from
the Water Information System for Europe (WISE) project of the European Environment Agency.28
Finally, in all regression I control for the latitude of the region’s centroid, which, to some
extent, should capture differences in geographic conditions other than those discussed above.
I.5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historical data on political and economic development at the sub-national level are not available for
all regions in my original sample. However, reliable measures are available from Tabellini (2005)
for a sample of 69 regions in eight western European countries including Belgium, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Tabellini’s data include historical
regional measures of political institutions, urbanization and educational attainment.29 With regard to
early political institutions the data include a measure of constraints on the executive between 1600
and 1850. This variable, analogous to the one included in the POLITY IV dataset (Eckstein and Gurr,
1975), is designed to capture “institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief ex-
ecutives”. According to this criterion, a region had better political institutions if the executive branch
was accountable to assemblies of elected representatives, and if the power of the executive was con-
strained by the existence of checks and balances and by the rule of law. The measure of constraints
on the executive was coded for different 40-year windows around the years 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800,
and 1850, and takes values from 1 (unconstrained authority) to 7 (maximum accountability and con-
straints). With regard to education, Tabellini’s data include regional measures of literacy around the
year 1880, the earliest date for which systematic information on education could be found. Finally,
26 The GLOBE data set has superseded the GTOP30 which, before the introduction of GLOBE, was considered the most
accurate digital elevation data set and had been used, among others, by ? in the above mentioned contribution.
27 For every cell i and neighboring cell j I calculate the absolute value of the difference in elevation between i’s center and
j’s center, and then divide it by the sea level distance between the two points to obtain the uphill slope (hi, j). I repeat
the same calculation for each of i’s neighbors (at most eight), and then average these slopes to calculate cell i’s mean
uphill slope (hi). Finally, to obtain the average uphill slope of the region’s land area (hr), I average hi across all cells in
region r.
28 More information about the WISE project are available at http://water.europa.eu/
29 A detailed description of the procedure and sources used in the construction of this variable is provided in the Appendix
of Tabellini’s paper (2005)
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the data include a measure of urbanization around 1850, measured as the share of regional population
living in cities of population 30,000 or more.
II. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
II.1. SOCIAL TRUST
As basic measure of social trust at the regional level I use the average individual score on the trust
question for all individuals interviewed in a region over the three ESS rounds (trust). The regional
average conceals very large variation among individuals within a region and is hence likely to be an
imperfect measure of regional trust attitudes. Besides measurement error, another concern is that,
given the relatively small number of respondents in some of the regions, the ESS samples may not be
fully representative of the regional population, and that differences in the average trust score might be
due to differences in the composition of the regional sample with regard to certain individual charac-
teristics that might be correlated with trust. To address this concern, in addition to the unconditional
average, I compute a conditional regional measure of social trust that accounts for differences in
some observable features of the individual respondents (trust_cond). Following Tabellini’s approach
(2005), in the comprehensive dataset of individual responses, I regress individual trust score on a
vector of regional dummy variables, three ESS round dummies, and a set of individual controls in-
cluding a dummy for the respondent gender, the respondent’s age and age squared, marital status, and
educational attainment. Education in particular, is intended to serve as proxy measures for individual
income, which has been shown to be highly correlated with trust attitudes. The regional measure of
conditional trust is taken to be the estimated coefficient on the regional dummy variables.30 The con-
ditional and unconditional regional measure of trust are very highly correlated (0.992); this suggests
that regional differences in average trust score are not driven by differences in the composition of the
respective samples, but are rather related to more fundamental cultural differences. In what follows
I will report the results obtained using the unconditional means. The conditional trust measure is
used for robustness checks. Figure 1 represents the distribution of the unconditional regional trust
measure, while the map in Figure A.1 displays its geographic distribution across the regions in the
sample, with darker values corresponding to higher levels of trust.31 It is immediately apparent that
there is general pattern of higher trust in the north and less in the south of Europe, and also that there
are important within-differences.
II.2. FAMILY TIES
To construct a compound measure of the strength of family ties I combine the three EVS questions
described above in two ways. First, in the whole data set of individual responses I extract the first
principal component of the three variables and use its regional average as a summary measure of
30 The coefficients on the individual controls in the first stage regression (Table —) are consistent with findings from
previous studies (): younger, more educated and female respondents tend to reports higher level of trust in others. When
regional dummies are included in the regression, almost all of them display highly significant coefficients; furthermore,
the R-square rises by... compared to a rise of ... when fixed effects are included.
31 Data are displayed in equal intervals, but the continuous measures are used in the econometric analysis.
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family ties at the regional level (family_pc). The principal component only captures the variation that
is common to the three variables. However, these attributes may have more than one relevant dimen-
sion of variation. To address this concern, I also compute the algebraic sum of the three variables
(family_sum). Given the way the three variables were recoded, for both the sum and the principal
component, a higher number reflects stronger family ties. Table 3 displays the correlation between
the three original cultural attributes and the summary measures of culture for the whole sample of
over 68,000 individuals. The correlation of three variables with each other is positive though not very
high. However, all of them are highly correlated with the principal component and the sum. Also, the
principal component is very highly correlated with the sum of the three variables which indicates that
the principal component assigns very similar weights to the three variables. Figure 2 represents the
distribution of the regional measure of family ties (principal component), and the map in Figure A.2
displays its geographic distribution across the regions in the EVS sample, with darker values corre-
sponding to stronger family ties. As with social trust, there is a significant difference between north
and south of Europe - with family ties stronger in the south (with the partial and surprising exception
of Greece) and weaker in the north - as well as important within differences.
II.3. MEASURING CLIMATE VARIABILITY
As discussed above, both the temporal and the spatial dimension of climate variability are relevant to
my theoretical argument. However, while measures of interannual climate variability can be derived
from both the contemporary and historical climate data, only the higher resolution of the CRU data
allows to measure spatial variability. In, fact using the ESTPR data to study the spatial variability
in climate is not worthwhile since the grid-cells are much larger and hence communication across
cells would have been very implausible given the transportation technology available in pre-industrial
times.
Temporal variability In what follows I describe the procedure used to construct measures of inter-
annual climate variability from the raw CRU monthly data for the period 1900-2000. Each measure of
variability is computed at at the cell level first, and then aggregated at the regional level. Year-to-year
climatic fluctuations coexist with both within-year fluctuations - particularly seasonal variations - and
long-run trends. A good measure of interannual variability should address this and isolate interannual
variation from seasonality and long-term trends. One way to control for seasonal variation is by look-
ing at how climatic conditions in a given month vary over the years. Starting from monthly data has
the added benefit of allowing us to aggregate over specific relevant periods, such as the growing sea-
son, as well as over the whole year. For each climatic variable x 1,200 observations are available for
each cell (12 months× 100 years). Consider climatic variable x, cell i (part of region r), month m and
year y, and define ximy as the value of x in cell i in month m in year y. For each month m, I compute the
standard deviation of ximy over all years (denoted σim), which measures the month-specific variability
of variable x in cell i.32 To obtain a compound measure of year-to-year variability for cell i I average
32 The use of the standard deviation (or variance) as a measure of climatic variability is common in climatology. This
measure was also used by economists to measure variability in climatic conditions (see among others Paxson, 1992).
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σim over the twelve months (or over other specific periods of interest). Finally, I average σi over all
cells in region r to obtain a regional measure of variability σr. The regional measures of temporal
variability for precipitation and temperature are labeled as pr_var and tm_var respectively. To ad-
dress the concern that these measure of variability may capture long-run trends in climatic conditions
in addition to interannual fluctuations, I construct complementary measures of variability following
the same procedure described above but using first differences instead of the actual observations. The
detrended variability measures (pr_var_det and tm_var_det) are highly correlated with the standard
measures, and will be used to check the robustness of the results.
The same procedure described above is used for the ESTPR data covering the period 1500-
2000. The only difference is that, in the case of the ESTPR data, seasonal and not monthly observa-
tions are available. Hence, given xisy, the value of climatic variable x in cell i in season s in year y,
I first compute σis, the standard deviation of xisy over all years, then average it over the four seasons
to obtain σi, and finally over all cells in region r to obtain σr. Following this procedure I can also
construct measures of variability for the entire 500-year period, but also focus on specific sub-periods,
as I will do in my empirical analysis.
Spatial variability To quantify how climate fluctuations are correlated across neighboring loca-
tions, I first need to define what I mean by neighborhood. For each cell i in the data, I identify a
set J of neighbors j to cell i, composed of those cells that share with i a border or a vertex, such
that each cell can have at most eight neighbors (see Figure —). The value of ximy in a given year y,
can be higher or lower than ¯xim, the mean x for month m in cell i over the entire 100-year period.
x_imy− ¯x_im represents the deviation in year y from the 100-year month m mean in cell i. For each
pair i, j I compute the correlation between monthly deviations in i and j over all months and years
(ρi, j) which measures how climate variations in cell i are correlated with variations in cell j. Finally,
in order to obtain a unique measure of spatial correlation for cell i, one needs to aggregate ρi, j across
all neighbors j. This can be done in different ways: I can calculate the average of the mean, the
median or the minimum of all ρ_i, j. Of these, the minimum best captures the local potential for
insurance, since an agent willingness to cooperate depends on the benefit of cooperating with my
most complementary neighbor. The mean and median may fail to fully capture this potential since
the dissimilarity of my best neighbor may be diluted by other neighbors’ similarity to my location.
The regional measures of spatial correlation in precipitation and temperature are labeled as pr_spcorr
and tm_spcorr respectively.
IV. EMPIRICAL STATEGY AND RESULTS
I. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To test the empirical relationship between cultural variables and climate variability I exploit differ-
ences across European regions. Using data at the sub-national level allows to control for all those
country-specific factors that may potentially have an impact on citizens’ trust attitudes - such as, for
example, government regulation (Aghion et al., 2009) - as well as the common historical background
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shared by regions belonging to the same country(Tabellini, 2007). The cross-regional approach allevi-
ates the concerns related to border and country formation inherent to cross-country analysis allowing
for a more compelling test of the validity of the theory.
I first investigate the relationship between climate variability and trust using both contemporary
and historical climate data. I then replicate the analysis using family ties as dependent variable. To
further test the robustness of the relationship between trust and historical climate variability, I finally
extend the analysis to account for differential patterns of early economic and institutional development
at the regional level.
My empirical strategy can be summarized by the following estimating equation:
Trustr,c = βx_varr + γx_spcorrr +αc +X
′
rδ + εr,c
The subscripts r and c index regions and countries respectively. The Trustr,c variable denotes
one of my two measures of trust (unconditional and conditional), which vary across regions. x_varr,c
and x_spcorrr,c denote respectively the degree of temporal variability and spatial correlation for cli-
matic variable x (temperature or precipitation) in region r; the last term is only included when using
contemporary climate data. αc denotes the country fixed effects. The vector X
′
r denotes a set of
regional controls which can include both the geographical and historical factors discussed in the pre-
vious section.
The coefficients of interest are β , the estimated relationship between temporal variability and
the regional measure of current trust, and and γ the estimated relationship between spatial correlation
in climatic fluctuations and trust. In particular, the theory predicts a positive sign for β and a negative
sign for γ .
An analogous equation is estimated for family ties. To allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation
within countries, in all regressions robust standard errors are clustered at the country level.
II. CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND SOCIAL TRUST
II.1. CONTEMPORARY VARIABILITY AND SOCIAL TRUST
I start by investigating the relationship between the level of trust in the ESS regions and climate
variability measured using the climatic data for the period 1900-2000, which allow me to analyze
both the temporal and spatial dimension of variability.
The underlying assumption for using contemporary data as an informative proxy for past cli-
mate is that the geographic distribution of climatic conditions in the twentieth century is similar to
that in past centuries. This assumption seems reasonable in light of the fact that the spatial distribution
of climatic conditions - both their average and variability - is in large part determined by differences
in geographic factors which tend to remain fairly stable over long periods of time.
A partial test can be performed by looking at the relationship between climatic conditions
for the periods 1900-2000 and 1500-1900. Figure A.4 provides a graphical representation of this
relationship separately for average precipitation, average temperature, precipitation variability and
19
temperature variability. The correlation between average temperature at the regional level in the last
century and in the previous four is 0.999, while it is 0.987 for average precipitation; the correlation
for the variability measures in different periods is lower but still large: 0.902 for precipitation, and
0.871 for temperature. These findings confirm that region characterized by more variable climate in
contemporary times tended to have more volatile climate also in the past, and provide reassurance
that the assumption is realistic.
Table 4 display the summary statistics for all the variables used in the trust analysis. Table 5
reports the results using the unconditional regional measure of trust, separately for precipitation and
temperature. In column 1 I regress the trust variable on the annualized measure of precipitation vari-
ability. The estimated coefficient for precipitation variability is positive, and statistically significant
(at the 5% level), which is consistent with climate variability positively affecting average trust score
at the regional level. In column 2 I include the vector of geographic controls described above, which
includes average temperature, average precipitation, terrain ruggedness, average soil quality, standard
deviation in soil quality, area of the region, a dummy for the region being landlocked, the distance of
the region’s centroid from the coast, the number of major rivers passing through the region, and the
latitude of the region’s centroid. When the controls are included the point estimate of the coefficient
of interest increases slightly and remains highly statistically significant (at 1% level). With regard the
magnitude of the coefficient, one standard deviation increase in precipitation variability corresponds
to a .17 standard deviation increase in trust. Of the other regressors, only average precipitation, lat-
itude and number of rivers display significant coefficients, negative for the first one and positive for
the other two.
The availability of monthly climatic data allow us to go a step further, and to investigate
whether variability in weather conditions over different parts of the year affects trust in different
ways. If patterns of mutual cooperation arose as a response to economic risk in times in which agri-
culture was the dominant economic activity, I would expect variability during the growing season
months to have a relatively larger effect on trust than variability during other months. The term of
the growing season depends on the geographic location and crops of interest. In the case of Europe,
cereals like wheat, barley and rye have historically been the most important and widespread crops,
representing the base of the European peasants’ diet (Le Roy Ladurie, 1971), followed by sugar beet,
rapeseed, sunflower seeds, and, in the South, olives and grapes. Even after the diffusion of potatoes
and corn - which became widespread in Europe only from the late 18th century - cereals continued
to remain preeminent.33 In general, the growing season for these crops coincides with the spring and
summer months.34 For example, in their study on the relationship between climate and crop yield at
the global level, Lobell and Field (2007)define the growing season for wheat as the months between
May and October, and for barley the months between May and August. Similarly, the USDA publi-
cation “Major Crop Areas and Climatic Profiles” reports the growing season for spring and summer
33 Even in current times, cereals continue to have a prominent role in European agriculture. According to the FAO-
Agromaps statistics, over the period 1975-2000, barley rye and wheat together account for approximately —% of the
European total agricultural production .
34 This is also the case for winter grain varieties, which are usually harvested at the end of the summer.
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grains for European countries to be from March-April to October-November, with the exact length
depending on the specific location (longer in the South and shorter in the North). In what follows I
define the growing season as the months between April and October; however, as discussed below,
all the results shown are robust to alternative choices of growing season.
In column 3, I include separately variability in precipitation for growing season months (GSM
henceforth) and non growing season months (NGSM). When doing so, only the coefficient on pre-
cipitation variability for the GSM is positive and highly significant, and the point estimate somewhat
larger than the one found in column 2 for variability over the whole year. This result suggests that
the variability in precipitation during the growing season months is accounting for most of the effect
found in column 2, consistent with the effect of climatic risk operating mainly through agriculture.
Since variability in the NGSM does not seem to add much to the picture, in what follows I will use
variability in the GSM as the regressor of interest.
As argued in section 2, if cooperative relations are aimed at providing mutual insurance from
weather related risk, I would expect the capacity to share and differentiate risk to be larger where
climatic shock are less correlated across neighboring locations, since this would facilitate differentia-
tion and increase the scope for insurance. Column 4 tests this hypothesis by including, together with
precipitation variability in the GSM, a measure of spatial correlation in precipitation anomalies. The
result of the regression supports an explanation involving risk sharing and mutual insurance: while the
coefficient on temporal variability continues to be positive and significant, the coefficient on spatial
correlation is negative and highly significant.
I find similar results when looking at temperature (columns 5-7). The relative magnitude of
the coefficient on temporal variability in temperature is larger than that on precipitation: one standard
deviation increase in annualized temperature variability (column 6) corresponds to a 0.27 standard
deviation increase in trust. However, I do not find the same result for spatial correlation in tempera-
ture. The coefficient is negative but the standard error is very large. This difference can be attributed
to the fact that the spatial correlation in temperature across neighboring locations is, on average, much
larger than that for precipitation, and does not offer enough variation to identify an effect. This result
is consistent with previous findings in climatology - and particularly with regard to the CRU data
on Europe - according to which the pattern in temperature appears to be much more spatially homo-
geneous than in precipitation. Figure 3 plots the estimated residuals of trust (on the vertical axis)
and variability (on the horizontal axis), estimated from a regression against the remaining regressors
(regional controls and country fixed effects), respectively for precipitation and temperature.
To verify the robustness of these results I perform a series of checks. The results are presented
in Table A.1. First, I re-estimate the main specification (with growing season variability and spatial
correlation) using the conditional measure of trust which accounts for differences in individual char-
acteristics of respondents in each region (column 1). The results obtained using the conditional and
unconditional measure of trust are qualitatively very similar, suggesting that the relationship between
variability and trust are not explained by regional differences in the composition of the respondents’
sample. I then replicate the analysis using the detrended measure of variability, to make sure the re-
sults are not influenced by long-term trends in climatic conditions (column 2). Once again, the results
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are very similar. To make sure the results are not driven by the relationship between variability and
trust in some particular countries, I re-estimate the main regression excluding Scandinavian countries,
usually characterized by extremely high levels of trust (column 3), and former communist countries,
which generally display low trust scores (column 4). In both cases, the results remain similar. Finally,
Appendix Table A.2 display the results obtained using alternative terms of the growing season which
are very similar to those obtained with the base specification.
II.2. HISTORICAL VARIABILITY AND SOCIAL TRUST
Overall, the results described so far, obtained using climatic data for the twentieth century, suggest
the existence of a robust correlation between patterns of temporal and spatial variability in climatic
conditions and social trust at the regional level. Insofar as the cross-region distribution of climatic
variability in the twentieth century is a good approximation for climatic variability in previous cen-
turies, this evidence supports the thesis of an historical impact of environmental volatility on the
emergence of norms of generalized trust. However, the same findings are also consistent with al-
ternative explanations emphasizing the effect of contemporary variability on trust. To test whether
differences in current levels of trust are related to historical rather than to contemporary climate vari-
ability, I replicate the analysis using reconstructed climatic data for the period 1500-2000. Due to
their lower spatial resolution (0.5º), the reconstructed data are too coarse to construct an accurate
measure of spatial correlation within reasonable distances. Therefore, these data are only used to
analyze the relationship between temporal variability in climate and trust.
In the first column of Table 6 I regress trust on precipitation variability for the growing season
over the period 1900-2000. Since for this period the ESTPR data are derived from the same CRU data
used above (although interpolated over larger areas), not surprisingly the coefficient on precipitation
variability is positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level). In column 2 I regress trust on
precipitation variability in the growing season calculated over the period 1500-1750. The choice of
this particular period is motivated by the desire to capture historical variability over a period charac-
terized by the prevalence of agriculture and natural resource-dependent activities, prior to the onset
of the industrial revolution which determined profound changes in the traditional forms of economic
and social organization throughout Europe.35 The coefficient on precipitation variability between
1500 and 1750 is also positive and significant (5% level), and larger than the coefficient on variability
between 1900 and 2000. Interestingly, when both variables are included in the regression (column 3),
the coefficient on historical variability continues to be positive and significant, while the coefficient
on precipitation variability over the last century becomes statistically insignificant. With regard to
the magnitude of the effect, a one standard deviation increase in growing season precipitation vari-
ability corresponds to an increase of 0.10 standard deviation in trust. Analogous results are found for
temperature (columns 3-5): temperature variability between 1500 and 1750 tends to have a positive
effect on trust even after controlling for variability between 1900 and 2000, which does not appear to
have an independent effect. In the case of temperature the effect is larger: a one standard deviation
35 Alternative choices of the reference period (e.g. 1500-1700 or 1500-1800) lead to very similar results
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increase in growing season variability implies a 0.20 standard deviation increase in trust.
Taken together, these results support an explanation emphasizing the historical influence of
climatic volatility on the emergence of norms of mutual trust, as opposed to alternative arguments
stressing the effect of contemporary climate variability on current trust attitudes.
III. CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND FAMILY TIES
III.1. CONTEMPORARY VARIABILITY AND FAMILY TIES
To further test the empirical validity of my theoretical argument I now look at the relationship between
climate volatility and the importance of the family, replicating the analysis performed in the previous
section.
To do so I combine the climate data with survey data from the European Value Survey. Table
7 display the summary statistics for all the variables used in the family ties analysis. As before, I
start by presenting the result of the analysis using climate data for the period 1900-2000. To measure
the strength of family ties I use both the sum and the first principal component of the three relevant
questions, as described in the data section. Table 8 present the results separately for precipitation
(columns 1-6) and temperature (7-12). All regressions include both country fixed effects and regional
geographical controls.
In column 1 I start by regressing the first principal component of family ties on annualized
variability in precipitation between 1900-2000. The coefficient on precipitation variability is positive
and statistically significant (5%). The result is consistent with that found for social trust and confirm
the theoretical predictions: in regions characterized by a more variable climate people tend to attach
less importance to the family. Once again, this result is primarily driven by variability in precipitation
during the growing season months, while variability during the other months displays no significant
effect (column 2). As for the case of trust, the spatial dimension of precipitation variability appears
to have a significant effect on the strength of family ties. In this case the coefficient on spatial corre-
lation is positive: more spatially correlated climatic shocks decrease the gain from cooperation with
outsiders, and increase the importance of within-family relations. Both effects are fairly large: one
standard deviation in precipitation variability in the growing season corresponds to a 0.26 decrease in
the strength of family ties, while one standard deviation in spatial correlation corresponds to a 0.11
standard deviation increase in family ties. Very similar results are obtained when using the sum of the
three cultural attributes as dependent variable: both the point estimates and significance levels remain
mostly unchanged.
Once again, the qualitative results for temperature are analogous: higher inter-annual variabil-
ity, particularly during the growing season, corresponds to weaker family ties. Furthermore, as with
trust, the coefficient on spatial correlation in temperature has the expected sign but is not statistically
significant. As with precipitation, the results are very similar when both measures of the strength of
family ties are used as dependent variable.
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III.2. HISTORICAL VARIABILITY AND FAMILY TIES
Using climate data for the previous centuries I then test whether differences in the strength of family
ties are related to historical rather than contemporary variability (Table 9). Once again, the results
are consistent with those found for trust: historical variability in the growing season’s precipitation
and temperature appear to have a negative, large and significant effect on the strength of family ties.
This effect remains, and becomes even larger, when controlling for climate variability over the last
century, which appears to have no significant effect on the dependent variable, or, in the case of
precipitation an inverse - though marginally significant - effect. The magnitude of the coefficients on
historical variability is considerable and comparable to what found for trust: a one standard deviation
in growing season variability corresponds to a 0.40 standard deviation decrease in the strength of
family ties, for precipitation, and a 0.38 standard deviation decrease for temperature.
IV. TRUST, CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The evidence presented above confirms the existence of a robust relationship between historical cli-
mate variability and current differences in trust. As a further robustness check, I then explore the
relationship between this result and findings from a previous study by Tabellini (2005) which empha-
size the impact of early political institutions on differences in trust across European regions. Doest
the effect of historical variability on trust persist when controlling for early political institutions?
Finding that this is the case would suggests that the demand for insurance against erratic weather
may have fostered the emergence of trust by favoring the adoption of other, more informal collective
arrangements whose long-lasting effect of trust is not captured by historical differences in institutions.
To explore this issue I extend my empirical analysis to include a regional measure of early
political institutions: constraints on the executive between 1600-1850, available from Tabellini (2005)
for 69 European regions. This variable was coded for different 40-year windows around the years
1600, 1700, 1750, 1800, and 1850, and takes values from 1 (unconstrained authority) to 7 (maximum
accountability and constraints). To be consistent with the time frame used in the construction of
the historical variability measure described above, I consider constraints on the executive in 1600,
1700 and 1750. Following Tabellini (2005), I use the first principal component of the three variables
as my main measure of early political institutions. However, all the results described below are
remain mostly unchanged when using each of the three variables separately or their arithmetic average
(Tables A.A.3 and A.A.4). Tabellini’s data also include regional measures of urbanization (around
1850) and literacy (around 1880), which I include as additional regressors in my analysis to explore
the relative importance of patterns of early economic development and human capital accumulation
on trust attitudes. Summary statistics for all the variables used in this section are shown in Table 10.
Table 11 reports the results of the regressions, all of which include country fixed effects and
the set of standard regional controls used before. In column 1 I regress the unconditional trust mea-
sure on precipitation variability in the growing season alone. The results for the smaller sample
(66 regions) confirm those found for larger sample: the coefficient on precipitation variability (in
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the growing season months) is positive, large, and statistically significant.36 Again, when historical
and contemporary variability are included in the regression (column 2), only the first one displays
a positive and significant coefficient (10% level). Column 3 displays the result of the regression of
trust on early institutions, literacy rate in 1880, and urbanization rate around 1850. The results are
consistent with Tabellini’s findings: past level of education and, particularly, early political institu-
tions, display a positive and significant effect on current levels of trust (significant at the 10% and
1% level respectively). Finally, the regression in column 4 includes precipitation variability along
with the three historical variables. When doing so, the coefficient on precipitation variability contin-
ues to be positive and statistically significant (5% level), while those on constraints on the executive
and literacy rate remain practically unchanged. With regard to the magnitude of the coefficients, the
effect of historical precipitation variability and early institutions on trust are comparable: while one
standard deviation increase in historical precipitation variability corresponds to a 0.33 standard de-
viation increase in trust, one standard deviation increase in the principal component of constraints
on the executive between 1600 and 1750 corresponds to a 0.45 standard deviation increase in trust.
Similar results hold for historical temperature variability (columns 5-8), which display a positive and
significant coefficient even when controlling for contemporary variability. Unlike for precipitation,
however, when historical temperature variability is included in the regression along with early insti-
tutions, literacy rate and urbanization (column 8), the point estimate on variability drops significantly
- from 2.343 to 1.962 - as well as does the coefficient on early institutions, from 0.146, when variabil-
ity is not included, to 0.091, which suggest that the two variables are correlated. Based on the point
estimates in column 8, historical temperature variability appears to have a relatively larger impact
on trust than early institutions: one standard deviation increase in historical temperature variability
increases trust by 0.56 standard deviation, compared to a 0.26 standard deviation increase for early
political institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
Social trust has become the object of extensive research in economics as part of a broader agenda on
the impact of culture on economic performance. Nevertheless, the economic origins of trust remain
relatively unexplored, limiting our understanding of the phenomenon and its implications for eco-
nomic development. Recent theoretical and empirical findings indicate that historical circumstances -
in particular historical experiences of cooperation - can have considerable and long-lasting effects on
the level of trust of a community, providing a coherent framework for further research on the historical
determinants of trust.
This paper contributes to this growing literature by examining the historical relationship be-
tween risk and the emergence of mutual cooperation and trust. In doing so, it focuses on a primitive
and universal source of environmental risk: climate volatility. The hypothesis advanced and tested in
this paper is that norms of generalized trust developed in pre-industrial times as a result of experiences
36 Three of the 69 regions included in Tabellini’s original sample, are not covered by the climatic data I use and are hence
excluded from the current analysis. These regions are: Madeira and Azores Islands (Portugal) and Canaries Island
(Spain).
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of cooperation triggered by the need for subsistence farmers to cope with climatic risk. Since cooper-
ation was particularly valuable in riskier environments, norms of trust became more prevalent in areas
exposed to more erratic weather. These norms were then transmitted from generation to generation
and managed to persist even after climate patterns had become less crucial for economic activity.
Insofar as these norms continue to influence the trust attitudes of the descendants, one should expect
to observe higher levels of trust in regions historically characterized by higher climatic variability.
My empirical results provide support for this prediction in the context of Europe. Combining
detailed climate data for the period 1500-2000 and contemporary survey data from the European
Social Survey I find that interannual variability in both temperature and precipitation has a significant
positive effect on current levels of trust at the regional level. This effect is mainly driven by climatic
variability in the growing season months. Furthermore, trust is higher in regions with more spatially
heterogeneous precipitation, in which risk-sharing through geographic differentiation would have
been more effective. Finally, trust is related to historical climate variability (between the 16th and
the 18th century) but not to contemporary variability (over the 20th century), a result which contrasts
with alternative explanations on the impact of contemporary variability on current trust.
These findings are further corroborated by evidence on the relationship between climatic vari-
ability and individuals’ beliefs on the importance of the family in their life. In line with recent stud-
ies documenting the existence of a negative empirical relationship between trust within and outside
the family, I find that in regions with higher temporal and spatial variability in climate, people have
weaker family ties. As in the case of trust, the strength of family ties is related to historical variability,
but not to contemporary variability, which appears to have no independent explanatory power.
The last part of the paper attempts to shed some light on the relationship between trust, cli-
mate variability and early political institutions. To do so I extend my empirical analysis to control
for measures of historical political and economic development at the regional level available from
Tabellini (2005). The results confirm the importance of early political institutions (and, to a lesser
extent, early literacy) for the emergence and diffusion of mutual trust (Tabellini, 2005). On the other
hand, historical climate variability continues to have a considerable impact on trust, which suggests
that the demand for insurance that aroused from exposure to erratic weather may have favored the
adoption of other more informal collective arrangements.
This research provides a new point of investigation into the emergence of social norms as
a product of collective responses to risk. However, the present study can provide only suggestive
evidence on the specific channel(s) through which exposure to climate variability may have favored
the development of a culture of trust. As the availability and quality of historical data improve, future
research should aim at sheding further ligth on this crucial question.
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Table 1: EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY: NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS BY COUNTRY/ROUND
Country Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Mean trust score
Austria 2,257 2,256 2,405 4.9
Belgium 1,899 1,778 1,798 4.9
Bulgaria - - 1,400 2.2
Czech Republic 1,360 3,026 - 3.3
Denmark 1,506 1,487 1,505 6.3
Estonia - 1,989 1,517 4.6
Finland 2,000 2,022 1,896 6.0
France 1,503 1,806 1,986 4.3
Germany 2,919 2,870 2,916 4.2
Greece 2,566 2,406 - 4.8
Hungary 1,685 1,498 1,518 4.1
Ireland 2,046 2,286 1,800 4.6
Italy 1,207 1,529 - 4.6
Luxembourg 1,552 1,635 - 5.7
Netherlands 2,364 1,881 1,889 4.9
Norway 2,036 1,760 1,750 5.6
Poland 2,110 1,716 1,721 2.9
Portugal 1,511 2,052 2,222 3.9
Slovakia - 1,512 1,766 4.2
Slovenia 1,519 1,442 1,476 4.1
Spain 1,729 1,663 1,876 5.0
Sweden 1,999 1,948 1,927 5.6
Switzerland 2,040 2,141 1,804 5.6
United Kingdom 2,052 1,897 2,394 4.3
Total 39,860 44,600 37,566
Figure 1: DISTRIBUTIONS OF TRUST SCORE IN ESS REGIONS
32
Table 2: EUROPEAN VALUE STUDY - NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS BY COUNTRY/WAVE
Country Round 1      (1989-1993)














Austria 1,460 - 1,522 3.854 1.695 1.690 -0.110 7.250
Belgium 2,792 1,912 3.820 1.725 1.777 0.040 7.344
Bulgaria 1,034 1,072 1,000 3.798 1.842 1.711 0.081 7.371
Czech Republic 3,033* 1,147 1,908 3.842 1.726 1.631 -0.137 7.230
Denmark 1,030 - 1,023 3.856 1.429 1.612 -0.610 6.900
Estonia 1,008† 1,021 1,005 3.697 1.775 1.710 -0.113 7.207
Finland 588† 987 1,038 3.771 1.674 1.682 -0.244 7.129
France 1,002 - 1,615 3.836 1.759 1.819 0.160 7.431
Germany 3,437 2,026 2,036 3.717 1.629 1.629 -0.409 7.006
Greece - - 1,139 3.799 1.692 1.679 -0.136 7.225
Hungary 999† 650 1,000 3.871 1.822 1.767 0.201 7.472
Ireland 1,000 1,012† - 3.894 1.776 1.802 0.236 7.502
Italy 2,018 - 2,000 3.868 1.811 1.875 0.385 7.600
Luxembourg - - 1,211 3.857 1.592 1.784 -0.072 7.277
Netherlands 1,017 1,003 3.725 1.366 1.806 -0.491 6.939
Norway 1,239 1,127† - 3.862 1.453 1.875 -0.146 7.222
Poland 1,920 1,153† 1,095 3.898 1.884 1.800 0.370 7.598
Portugal 1,185 - 1,000 3.705 1.811 1.867 0.177 7.404
Slovakia 1,602‡ 1,095 1,331 3.868 1.762 1.734 0.100 7.404
Slovenia 1,035 1,007† 1,006 3.783 1.802 1.847 0.221 7.457
Spain 4,147 1,211 2,409 3.821 1.825 1.847 0.297 7.524
Sweden 1,047 1,009† 1,015 3.852 1.469 1.783 -0.276 7.131
Switzerland - 1,212 - 3.792 1.714 1.692 -0.139 7.209
United Kingdom 1,788 1,093 1,959 3.865 1.709 1.831 0.129 7.417
Total 34,381 16,882 29,227
‡ Of these, for 1,136 individuals intreviewed in 1999 no information on the region of residence was available.
Table 2. European Value Study -  Number of respondents per country/wave
* Of these, for 2,109 individuals intreviewed in 2001 no information on the region of residence was available.
† No information on the respondent's region of residence available.
Figure 2: DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY TIES (P.C) BY EVS REGIONS
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Parents' responsibility 0.088 0.169
Family Ties (P.C.) 0.512 0.695 0.698
Family Ties (sum) 0.627 0.652 0.638 0.990
Observations: 55754
Family Ties (EVS) - Correlation among variables
Table 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE TRUST-CLIMATE ANALYSIS
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust unconditional (0-10) 251 4.72 1.12 1.11 7.31
Precipitation variability 12 months (mm) 251 34.15 12.21 17.43 76.17
Precipitation variability GSM  (mm) 251 33.98 10.99 15.04 77.68
Precipitation variability NGSM  (mm) 251 34.38 16.23 12.27 87.62
Precipitation spatial correlation  251  0.93 0.04 0.89 0.98
Temperature variability 12 months (°C) 251 1.64 0.29 1.03 2.43
Temperature variability GSM (°C) 251 1.35 0.16 0.90 1.71
Temperature variability NGSM (°C) 251 2.04 0.51 1.11 3.45
Temperature spatial correlation  251  0.98 0.00 0.96 0.99
Precipitation Average 12 months (mm) 251 66.64 22.40 32.32 148.98
Temperature Average 12 months (°C) 251 9.12 3.22 -1.47 17.63
Precipitation variability GSM 1500-1750 (mm) 248 15.31 7.38 6.92 49.10
Precipitation variability GSM 1900-2000 (mm) 248 16.78 6.39 7.85 51.45
Temperature variability GSM 1500-1750 (°C) 248 0.78 0.17 0.30 1.14
Temperature variability GSM 1900-2000 (°C) 248 1.01 0.20 0.64 1.57
Precipitation average 1500-2000 (mm) 248 67.28 26.06 28.40 166.40
Temperature average 1500-2000 (°C) 248 8.76 3.34 -1.59 17.56
Terrain Ruggedness 251 1.43 1.50 0.01 7.99
Soil Suitability average (0-6) 251 2.28 0.86 0 4.90
Soil Suitability st.dev. 251 1.03 0.41 0 2.02
Area (km2) 251 17,077 23,954 96 168,466
Landlocked 251 0.55 0.50 0 1
Distance to the coast (km) 251 149.93 147.22 0 588.47
Number of major rivers 251 1.18 1.58 0 11
Latitude (°) 251 48.70 6.41 35.23 68.85







Table 5: SOCIAL TRUST AND CLIMATE VARIABILITY
CLIMATE DATA: 1900-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.133** 0.155*** 1.060** 1.028***
(0.058) (0.042) (0.490) (0.304)
0.193*** 0.168*** 0.958** 1.019***





0.007 0.025 0.040* 0.035 0.036 0.036
(0.035) (0.038) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
-0.051* -0.046* -0.044** 0.028 0.026 0.027
(0.026) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
0.030 0.043 0.037 0.074 0.064 0.072
(0.061) (0.067) (0.043) (0.054) (0.059) (0.057)
-0.003 -0.008 0.008 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.036) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
0.031 0.028 0.047 0.030 0.023 0.029
(0.064) (0.068) (0.055) (0.057) (0.063) (0.059)
-0.323 -0.211 -0.054 -0.197 -0.205 -0.197
(0.215) (0.228) (0.130) (0.206) (0.204) (0.206)
0.008 0.007 0.057 -0.006 -0.013 -0.005
(0.098) (0.101) (0.075) (0.109) (0.105) (0.108)
0.060 0.052 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.027
(0.048) (0.048) (0.030) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043)
0.071** 0.062** 0.040* 0.055* 0.054* 0.055*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
0.058** 0.057** 0.054*** 0.038 0.042 0.039
(0.028) (0.024) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251
Number of clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-square 0.881 0.888 0.889 0.945 0.883 0.889 0.889 0.889
Latitude
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Access to Rivers
Soil Quality (St. Dev.)
Area
Landlocked





Variability                 
(12 Months)
Variability                 
(growing season months)
Variability                 
(non-growing season months)
Spatial Correlation
Table 1. Social Trust and Climate Variability
Climate data: 1900-2000
Dependent variable: Trust in others (unconditional regional average)
Precipitation Temperature
Figure 3: CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND TRUST
OLS RESIDUALS (AFTER CONTROLLING FOR COUNTRY F.E. AND REGIONAL CONTROLS)
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Table 6: SOCIAL TRUST AND CLIMATE VARIABILITY
CLIMATE DATA: 1500-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.132** 0.141** 1.303*** 1.311***
(0.050) (0.059) (0.248) (0.369)
0.109* -0.026 1.040** -0.019
(0.057) (0.043) (0.455) (0.580)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248
Number of clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-square 0.894 0.895 0.895 0.890 0.890 0.890
Variability GSM         
(1900-2000)
OLS regressions. Regional controls: mean temperature, mean precipitation, average ruggedness index, soil suitability (average and
standard deviation), area, dummy for landlocked, distance from of the region's centroid from the coast, number of major rivers
passing through the region, latitude of the region's centroid. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis.
***,** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Table 2. Social Trust and Climate Variability
Climate data: 1500-2000
Dependent variable: Trust in others (unconditional regional average)
Precipitation Temperature
Variability GSM         
(1500-1750)
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Table 7: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE FAMILY TIES-CLIMATE ANALYSIS
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Family ties first principal component 220 0.02 0.35 -1.01 0.91
Family ties sum (0-8) 220 7.31 0.26 6.62 7.92
Precipitation variability 12 months (mm) 220 34.38 12.31 17.43 76.17
Precipitation variability GSM  (mm) 220 34.13 11.00 15.04 77.68
Precipitation variability NGSM  (mm) 220 34.72 16.36 12.27 91.60
Precipitation spatial correlation 220 0.93 0.04 0.90 0.98
Temperature variability 12 months (°C) 220 1.64 0.30 1.03 2.43
Temperature variability GSM (°C) 220 1.35 0.17 0.90 1.71
Temperature variability NGSM (°C) 220 2.04 0.53 1.11 3.45
Temperature spatial correlation 220 0.98 0.00 0.96 0.99
Precipitation Average 12 months (mm) 220 66.80 22.00 39.28 148.06
Temperature Average 12 months (°C) 220 9.06 3.28 -1.47 17.63
Precipitation variability GSM 1500-1750 (mm) 217 16.30264 6.65 6.84 39.73
Precipitation variability GSM 1900-2000 (mm) 217 19.96012 7.11 10.56 52.41
Temperature variability GSM 1500-1750 (°C) 217 0.718353 0.17 0.30 1.02
Temperature variability GSM 1900-2000 (°C) 217 0.928003 0.14 0.64 1.33
Precipitation average 1500-2000 (mm) 217 67.78502 26.59 34.96 166.40
Temperature average 1500-2000 (°C) 217 8.70063 3.40 -1.59 17.56
Terrain Ruggedness 220 1.43 1.50 0.01 7.99
Soil Suitability average (0-6) 220 2.26 0.89 0.002544 4.90
Soil Suitability st.dev. 220 1.05 0.41 0 1.973814
Area (km2) 220 20,124 8,209 96 102,466
Landlocked 220 0.51 0.50 0 1
Distance to the coast (km) 220 142.73 139.76 0.2751 585.74
Number of major rivers 220 1.22 1.75 0 15
Latitude (°) 220 49.06 6.52 36.74 68.85







Table 8: FAMILY TIES AND CLIMATE VARIABILITY
CLIMATE DATA: 1900-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.072** -0.392* -0.069** -0.416*
(0.033) (0.214) (0.031) (0.227)
-0.081*** -0.086*** -0.692*** -0.592*** -0.079** -0.083*** -0.692*** -0.576***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.219) (0.188) (0.028) (0.021) (0.220) (0.196)
-0.004 0.063 -0.003 0.046
(0.024) (0.130) (0.023) (0.137)
4.567** 7.592 5.158** 10.925
(1.825) (8.782) (1.903) (8.286)
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
Number of clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-square 0.826 0.828 0.832 0.826 0.832 0.832 0.782 0.783 0.789 0.783 0.789 0.791
Table 3. Family Ties and Climate Variability
Climate data: 1900-2000
Family Ties (Principal Component) Family Ties (Sum)
Precipitation Temperature Precipitation Temperature
OLS regressions. Regional controls: mean temperature, mean precipitation, average ruggedness index, soil suitability (average and standard deviation), area, dummy for landlocked, distance from of the 
region's centroid from the coast, number of major rivers passing through the region, latitude of the region's centroid. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Variability                  
(12 Months)
Variability                  
(growing season months)
Variability                  
(non-growing season months)
Spatial Correlation
Table 9: FAMILY TIES AND CLIMATE VARIABILITY
CLIMATE DATA: 1500-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.205** -0.300** -0.205** -0.306*** -0.769*** -0.876*** -0.781*** -0.880***
(0.085) (0.112) (0.081) (0.100) (0.211) (0.228) (0.205) (0.209)
0.129* 0.138 0.362 0.334
(0.074) (0.081) (0.344) (0.327)
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218
Number of clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-square 0.830 0.833 0.785 0.789 0.836 0.837 0.792 0.793
OLS regressions. Regional controls: mean temperature, mean precipitation, average ruggedness index, soil suitability (average and standard deviation),
area, dummy for landlocked, distance from of the region's centroid from the coast, number of major rivers passing through the region, latitude of the
region's centroid. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Precipitation Temperature
Family Ties (Principal Component) Family Ties (Sum)
Variability GSM        
(1500-1750)




Table 4. Family Ties and Climate Variability
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Table 10: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE TRUST-CLIMATE-INSTITUTIONS ANALYSIS
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust unconditional (0-10) 66 4.77 0.57 2.70 5.84
Precipitation variability GSM 1500-1750 (mm) 66 16.24 4.46 8.16 31.12
Precipitation variability GSM 1900-2000 (mm) 66 17.94 4.30 10.22 36.03
Temperature variability GSM 1500-1750 (°C) 66 0.74 0.17 0.39 1.01
Temperature variability GSM 1900-2000 (°C) 66 0.84 0.08 0.64 0.99
Precipitation average 1500-2000 (mm) 66 58.12 20.85 22.55 115.07
Temperature average 1500-2000 (°C) 66 13.84 2.54 8.93 18.64
Institutions 1600-1750 (first principal component) 66 0.00 1.65 -1.34 3.06
Institutions 1600-1750 (average) 66 2.24 1.55 1  5
Urbanization rate (1880) 66 11.61 13.35 0 57.43
Literacy rate (1880) 64 55.40 25.73 14.60 96.50
Terrain Ruggedness 66 1.26 1.03 0.02 4.10
Soil Suitability average (0-6) 66 2.24 0.57 0.99 3.79
Soil Suitability st.dev. 66 1.21 0.37 0.37 1.95
Area (km2) 66 30,137 28,676 161 145,130
Landlocked 66 0.35 0.48 0 1
Distance to the coast (km) 66 97.66 99.19 0.31 417.20
Number of major rivers 66 2.06 2.59 0 15
Latitude (°) 66 46.11 5.52 37.22 56.19







Table 11: TRUST, CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND INSTITUTIONS
CLIMATE DATA: 1500-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.404** 0.620* 0.476** 2.364** 2.123** 1.962*
(0.144) (0.271) (0.166) (0.935) (0.849) (1.003)
-0.308 0.702
(0.214) (0.951)
0.148*** 0.155** 0.148*** 0.091**
(0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.031)
0.010* 0.009** 0.010* 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66 66 64 64 66 66 64 64
Number of clusters 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
R-square 0.724 0.727 0.753 0.767 0.769 0.770 0.753 0.781
OLS regressions. Regional controls: mean temperature, mean precipitation, average ruggedness index, soil suitability (average and standard deviation), area,
dummy for landlocked, number of major rivers passing through the region, distance from of the region's centroid from the coast, latitude of the region's
centroid. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Dependent variable: Trust in others (unconditional regional average)
Precipitation Temperature
Contraints on Executive P.C. 
(1600-1750)




Variability GSM           
(1500-1750)




Figure A.1: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTIONS OF TRUST SCORE IN ESS REGIONS
Figure A.2: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY TIES (P.C) IN EVS REGIONS
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Figure A.3: GRID CELL SIZE FOR CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL CLIMATE DATA









Figure A.4: CLIMATE 1900-2000 AND 1500-1900
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.132*** 0.167*** 0.211*** 1.060*** 0.977*** 1.518***
(0.041) (0.054) (0.049) (0.333) (0.328) (0.443)
0.118*** 0.635***
-0.03 (0.208)
-4.461** -5.687*** -6.202** -8.909*** 7.999 -3.385 -0.314 -7.414
(2.093) (1.958) (2.596) (1.744) (11.277) (13.915) (14.354) (14.650)
0.038* 0.040* 0.043* 0.053** 0.025 0.032 0.033 0.085***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.027)
-0.029** -0.042** -0.029 -0.055** 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.020
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.015)
0.038 0.035 0.012 0.038 0.039 0.071 0.075 0.129**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.050)
0.001 0.007 -0.009 0.036 -0.006 0.001 -0.016 0.003
(0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034) (0.045) (0.041)
0.041 0.042 0.096 0.041 0.010 0.027 0.038 0.035
(0.047) (0.055) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.090) (0.071)
0.013 -0.060 0.016 -0.021 -0.171 -0.195 -0.043 -0.055
(0.106) (0.132) (0.126) (0.139) (0.183) (0.212) (0.167) (0.213)
0.039 0.053 0.037 0.070 -0.023 0.003 -0.015 0.019
(0.067) (0.076) (0.081) (0.086) (0.096) (0.105) (0.109) (0.122)
0.030 0.027 0.028 0.054 0.034 0.028 0.038 -0.007
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.051) (0.034) (0.044) (0.047) (0.066)
0.044** 0.040* 0.034* 0.038 0.056* 0.058* 0.049 0.040
(0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
0.046** 0.055*** 0.046** 0.065*** 0.045 0.042 0.052 0.053
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.030) (0.040) (0.032)
Scandinavian regions Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Ex-communist regions Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 251 251 217 167 251 251 217 167
Number of clusters 24 24 20 18 24 24 20 18
R-square 0.951 0.944 0.884 0.955 0.892 0.888 0.794 0.928
Appendix Table 1. Social Trust and Climate Variability (1900-2000)
Robusteness Checks
Soil Quality (Average)








Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the conditional measure of trust in columns 1 and 5, and the unconditional measure of trust in the other ones.
Scandinavian regions (all regions of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are excluded from the sample in columns 3 and 7; formerly communist regions (all
regions of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, and the eastern regions of Germany) are excluded from the sample in columns 4 and 8.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Variability GSM
Variability GSM (detrended)




Table A.2: SOCIAL TRUST AND CLIMATE VARIABILITY (1900-2000)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.169*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.175*** 1.133*** 1.718*** 1.129*** 1.060**
(0.042) (0.040) (0.037) (0.049) (0.315) (0.586) (0.294) (0.380)
-5.652*** -5.687*** -5.601** -5.911*** 3.959 -0.946 2.686 4.122
(1.977) (2.024) (2.026) (1.989) (13.859) (14.845) (13.896) (13.873)
0.034 0.035 0.031 0.044* 0.033 0.017 0.032 0.029
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031)
-0.048*** -0.041** -0.044** -0.038** 0.023 -0.048 0.024 0.019
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020)
0.032 0.037 0.034 0.037 0.058 0.038 0.060 0.056
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.060) (0.067) (0.060) (0.062)
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
0.045 0.047 0.046 0.049 0.019 0.030 0.023 0.015
(0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.063) (0.066) (0.061) (0.064)
-0.080 -0.087 -0.105 -0.025 -0.234 -0.259 -0.244 -0.219
(0.127) (0.131) (0.129) (0.130) (0.203) (0.210) (0.208) (0.200)
0.052 0.054 0.050 0.059 -0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.006
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.101) (0.095) (0.102) (0.097)
0.027 0.029 0.030 0.021 0.028 0.056 0.023 0.028
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038)
0.042* 0.043* 0.044* 0.037 0.058* 0.066** 0.059* 0.056*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
0.052** 0.054*** 0.052** 0.055*** 0.046 0.058** 0.044 0.052*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251
Number of clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24






Soil Quality (St. Dev.)
Precipitation
OLS regressions. "Variability GSM" is the variability in the growing season months defined as the months from March to October (columns 1 and 5), April to
November (columns 2 and 6), March to November (columns 3 and 7) and April to September (columns 4 and 8). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Growing season months: Growing season months:
Area
Landlocked
Distance to the Coast
Temperature
Variability GSM




Dependent variable: Trust in others (unconditional regional average)
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Table A.3: TRUST, PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY AND INSTITUTIONS




1600-1750 1600 1600 1700 1700 1750 1750
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.478** 0.469** 0.450** 0.502**
(0.170) (0.142) (0.160) (0.187)
0.163*** 0.171** 0.147*** 0.153** 0.152*** 0.156** 0.142*** 0.157**
(0.040) (0.050) (0.039) (0.045) (0.040) (0.053) (0.033) (0.052)
0.010* 0.009** 0.011** 0.010** 0.009* 0.009* 0.009 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
-0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64Observations 66 66 64 64 66 66 64 64
Number of clusters 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
R-square 0.752 0.767 0.755 0.769 0.747 0.760 0.746 0.762
OLS regressions. "Constraints on the executive" is the average score for the years 1600, 1700, and 1750 in columns 1 and 2, the score for 1600 (columns 3 and 4), for 1700
(columns 5 and 6) and for 1750 (columns 7 and 8). Regional controls: mean temperature, mean precipitation, average ruggedness index, soil suitability (average and
standard deviation), area, dummy for landlocked, number of major rivers passing through the region, distance from of the region's centroid from the coast, latitude of the
region's centroid. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Contraints on the Executive
Literacy (1880)
Urbanization (1850)
Dependent variable: Trust in others (unconditional regional average)
Constraints on the executive:
Precipitation Variability GSM 
(1500-1750)
Table A.4: TRUST, TEMPERATURE VARIABILITY AND INSTITUTIONS




1600-1750 1600 1600 1700 1700 1750 1750
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.977* 1.904* 2.034* 2.133*
(1.004) (0.981) (1.020) (1.013)
0.163*** 0.102** 0.147*** 0.087** 0.152*** 0.085** 0.142*** 0.105***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.039) (0.033) (0.040) (0.035) (0.033) (0.025)
0.010* 0.005 0.011** 0.006 0.009* 0.004 0.009 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
-0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Number of clusters 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
R-square 0.752 0.781 0.755 0.780 0.747 0.778 0.746 0.783
OLS regressions. "Constraints on the executive" is the average score for the years 1600, 1700, and 1750 in columns 1 and 2, the score for 1600 (columns 3 and 4), for 1700
(columns 5 and 6) and for 1750 (columns 7 and 8). Regional controls: mean temperature, mean precipitation, average ruggedness index, soil suitability (average and standard
deviation), area, dummy for landlocked, number of major rivers passing through the region, distance from of the region's centroid from the coast, latitude of the region's
centroid. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Dependent variable: Trust in others (unconditional regional average)
Constraints on the Executive:
Temperature Variability GSM 
(1500-1750)
Contraints on the Executive
Literacy (1880)
Urbanization (1850)
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